Mean-Field Games on Networks and Wardrop Equilibria - Graduate Seminar
- Ricardo De Lima Ribeiro, Research Specialist, CEMSE, KAUST
B9 L2 R2322
Models for flows on networks arise in the study of traffic and pedestrian crowds. These models encode congestion effects, the behavior and preferences of agents, such as aversion to crowds and their attempts to minimize travel time. We will present the Wardrop equilibrium model on networks with flow-dependent costs and its connection with stationary mean-field game.
Overview
Abstract
Models for flows on networks arise in the study of traffic and pedestrian crowds. These models encode congestion effects, the behavior and preferences of agents, such as aversion to crowds and their attempts to minimize travel time. We will present the Wardrop equilibrium model on networks with flow-dependent costs and its connection with stationary mean-field games.
Brief Biography
Ricardo Ribeiro does research in MFGs and PDEs at CEMSE-KAUST since 2019. Before that he was Professor of Mathematics at UNICAMP (1 year) and UTFPR-Londrina (4 years). He did his PhD under supervision of professors Manuel Valentim Garcia (advisor) and Diogo A. Gomes (co-advisor).
